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Monago et al.: Literature Update: Selected Law Review Article Summaries

LITERATURE UPDATE
This compilation includes
briefoverviews of selected articles
appearingin other artand entertainment law journals within the
pastyear.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
1992 Vol. 42, No. 2

Niro, ProtectingCharacters
Through CopyrightLaw: Paving a New Road Upon Which
Literary, Graphic, and Motion
Picture CharactersCan All
Travel. [pp. 359-394]
In this article, the author proposes a single standard which
will adequately protect graphic,
motion picture and literary characters under copyright law.
Currently, courts use either the
character delineation test for cartoon characters (if the character is
sufficiently described as to
appearance, behavior, and traits,
then it is protected) or the "story
being told" test for motion picture
characters (if the character is
more than the story, then it is
protected). For a literary character to be protected, the character
must be fully delineated and constitute a primary element of the
storyline.
The author's proposed test is
a sliding scale which incorporates
several crucial factors: physical
depiction, personality traits and
the setting of the story in which
the character originally appears.
The article then examines each of
these factors in detail.
The author proposes that this
test allows the court to "touch
and feel" the character so that the
"the more recognizable the character, the more protection the
character should be granted."
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HASTINGS LAW
JOURNAL
1992 Vol. 43, No. 2
Lubliner, I Can't Believe I
Taped the Whole Thing: The
Case Against VCRs That Zap
Commercials. [pp. 473-504]
VCRs have entered the age of
automatic commercial avoidance
technology. This means that a
VCR may now cease recording
when a commercial is broadcast
and resume recording when the
program returns. The author of
this note states that such technology is undesirable, inefficient,
and contrary to American law
-specifically, the Communications Act and the Copyright Act.
The Communications Act of
1934 established the FCC, whose
mission is to regulate public interest in the area of broadcast communications. The FCC must continuously balance the competing
interests of the audience's right to
view the programs it wishes and
the broadcasters' right to have
stable television markets. The
private viewing doctrine recognizes that one's right to capture
an unencrypted signal for their
own use is subordinate to the
rights of those with proprietary
interests in the signal to make a
profit. The FCC feels that a balance of the interests which favors
the broadcasters is best for the
public interest as a whole.
This article next turns to the
Fair Use Doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976 and concludes
that no one would be harmed by
a ban on the sale of commercial
avoidance VCRs. In a recent case
involving VCRs and the Fair Use
Doctrine, the United States
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show some meaningful
likelihood of future harm from

video recording in order to prevail on a claim. The author found
that the harm to the broadcasters
would indeed be great due to the
loss in revenue once such a VCR
becomes popular. On the other
hand, there is little harm to the
VCR industry since most households presently own VCRs.
The author believes that a law
is necessary to bar the manufacture and sale of the automatic
commercial avoidance VCRs. In
this way, the problem would be
solved prospectively and companies could avoid investing further
money into research and development of the VCRs.

INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY JOURNAL
1992 Vol. 6
Wood, Two Left Feet:
Government's Tango With
Copyright and Choreography.
[pp. 291-312]
The purposes of copyright
laws are to encourage creativity
by rewarding creators and to disseminate fresh ideas into the
community. Historically, choreography has not been given much
attention because legislators have
found it difficult to arrive at a definition of "choreography" or
"dance" which can be used in
copyright law. The author agrees
that a bright-line definition of
choreography cannot be drawn,
but that nevertheless, choreography should be entitled to the
same protection as other art
forms.
The article compares the
copyright statutes of the United
States and Canada to see how
these two countries deal with the
protection of choreography.
Under Canadian copyright law,
choreography is defined and
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included in the same category as
drama. This implies that choreography which has a storyline
will be protected, but abstract
dance will not. In the United
States, The Copyright Act of 1976
contains no definition of choreography. Unlike the Canadian law,
however, choreography is recognized in a separate copyright
group, which implies that abstract
dance is protected as well.
The author believes that
choreography belongs in a separate category in order to grant it
broader protection. She suggests
that the dance community, rather
than the legislature, define choreography. By allowing the dance
community to create a definition,
it would allow for protection of
dance as it grows and changes.

JOURNAL OF THE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY
May 1992 Vol.74
Coleman, Color as Trademarks: Breaking Down the
Barriers of the Mere Color
Rule. [pp. 345-368]
This article addresses the use
of color as a trademark and the
mere color rule as an obstacle to

this. Coleman begins with a discussion concerning the functions

of trademark and the rationale for
such protection of color along

with the development of the mere
color rule. He then examines the
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation litigation and its dismissal of the justifications for the
mere color rule. However, in the
time since Owens-Corning was
allowed to register the color pink
as a trademark for its insulation,
confusion and indecision in other
federal courts have eroded the
potential of this landmark decision. A discussion of the Nutrasweet decision notes the return of
the mere color rule and the
resulting split in the circuits. To
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remedy this conflict, the author
suggests a two-part test to determine whether a color can be protected as a trademark: first,
whether or not the color of the
product performs a trademark
function and second, whether the
color of the product as applied to
the product is functional. If
courts would focus on the function of trademarks in modern
business practice, they would be
able to protect colors in certain
situations without creating barriers to competition in the relevant

market area or deterring new
entrants into the product market.
Coleman concludes that color
should be entitled to protection
when it begins to function as a
trademark.

LOYOLA OF LOS
ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

In addition, local non-discrimination ordinances have been issued
in Los Angeles and West Hollywood to protect infected and
high risk individuals.
In response to AIDS discrimination claims, employers assert
that they are concerned that HIV
actors will transmit the virus during love scenes. They also have
financial considerations: the marketability of the actor is reduced
if he/she is infected, and a fear
exists that the actor will not survive to finish the project.
The author argues that these
claims are baseless. First of all,
fear of transmission is only a factor in hard core pornography. As
for the marketability and health of
the actor, those concerns are too
subjective to justify discrimination.
The article concludes with a

discussion of methods to detect
HIV in the industry. The author

1992 Vol. 12, No. 2
Ancker, The Making of a
Nightmare: AIDS Storms
Hollywood. [pp. 325-365]

prefers voluntary testing in the
interests of the actor's privacy.

Hollywood has begun to
show an intolerance for actors
who have AIDS or who are
HlV-positive. In this article, the
author begins with a discussion
of the law available which can
help HIV-positive actors who
experience discrimination. The
article then addresses the defenses employers assert against AIDS
discrimination claims.
The author suggests that The
Rehabilitation Act may be applied
to aid victims of discrimination.
This law was originally designed
to prohibit discrimination by federally funded employers against
handicapped persons. It is now
also being used to assist HIV-positive actors because recently a
federal appellate case stated that
people with AIDS are "handicapped" under the Act. As for
privately funded employers, the
Americans With Disabilities Act
places a similar burden on them.

1992 Vol. 1992

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Snyder, Movies and Product
Placement: Is Hollywood

Turning Films Into Commercial
Speech? [pp. 301-337]
This note examines the possibility that product placement, the
practice of using products in
movies as props in return for a
fee from the manufacturer, may
result in classification of some
films as commercial speech. First,
the author provides an overview
of product placement and the
controversies this practice has
generated. Some movie critics
and consumer advocates construe
product placement as a form of
subliminal advertising and, as a
result, there has been demand
from special interest groups for
legislation in this area. This note
then addresses the relationship

Journal of Art & Entertainment Law
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between product placement and
commercial speech, which government may regulate. If movies,
as a result of extensive product
placement, are defined as commercial speech, government may
require relevant warnings or disclosures to be made about the
products contained therein. The
author submits that product
placement does not make a film
tantamount to commercial speech
as defined by Supreme Court
opinions on the matter. Finally,
the article concludes that market
forces, not legislation, are the
best means of curtailing product
placement; moviegoers can simply choose not to attend films
that use product placement.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
ENTERTAINMENT &
SPORTS LAW REVIEW
1992 Vol. 9
Allen, Look what they've done
to my song Ma - digital sampling in the 90's: a legal challenge to the music industry.
[pp. 179-200]
This article addresses the current plight of original artists who
are uncompensated monetarily
and artistically for the use of their
work. The author calls for a
broad reading of the current
copyright statute to include claims
of digital sampling. Allen defines
digital sampling at the outset and
then discusses the available causes of action in this field.
Although the Copyright Act of
1976 does not specifically refer to
digital sampling, the author feels
that a broad reading of the Act
may permit several causes of
action. Allen then discusses the
recognized remedies which
include injunctions, actual damages, recovery of infringing profits and/or statutory damages. But
as far as damages are concerned,
it is likely that a court would only
award the statutory minimum
because the overburdened judi-

Fall, 1992
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ciary wishes to discourage musicians from pursuing these claims.
In conclusion, the author stresses
the difficulty a plaintiff faces in
order to successfully argue an
infringement claim in the context
of digital sampling under the current Copyright Act.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CAUFORNIA
LAW REVIEW
1992 Vol. 65, No. 3

Baker, La(w)-A Note to Follow
So: Have We Forgotten the
Federal Rules of Evidence in

Music Plagiarism Cases?
[pp. 1583-1637]
This article suggests that structure and cohesiveness would be
added to music plagiarism cases
by applying Federal Rules of Evidence to music expert testimony.
The role that the music expert
plays in these cases is critical
because he dissects the pieces of
music at issue and must explain
to a jury the similarities or differences between the pieces.
Because there are a variety of
music analyses which experts
may use to illustrate the similarities or differences, juries will
arrive at different results about
the validity of these tests, and,
thus, the cases are not resolved
consistently.
The author suggests a plan
for achieving some level of predictability in these cases. First,
she suggests using only one
method of music analysis. Next,
she suggests applying Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 to music
expert's testimony in order to
demonstrate that there is sufficient reliability to the expert's
method of analyzing music.
Finally, the author proposes that
the music expert be allowed to
give the jury a music tutorial so
they will become familiar with
the basic theories and terminology of music.

WILLIAM AND MARY
LAW REVIEW
1992 Vol. 33

Edwards, Obscenity in Age of
Direct Broadcast Satellite: A
Final Burial for Stanley v.
Georgia(?), A National
Obscenity Standard, and
Other Miscellany. [pp. 949-

993]

This note examines federal
and state obscenity laws as
applied to direct broadcast satellite. The author finds that, generally, a common carrier broadcast
satellite transmitter cannot be
held liable for carrying obscene
material, so long as the carrier
does not have a pecuniary interest in the material broadcast and
does not violate federal laws prohibiting editorial control over
broadcast material. Nonetheless, a
local community that receives the
broadcast signal in an unscrambled form may seek to hold the
common carrier liable. The author
characterizes this local community control as "minimum common
denominator obscenity standard,"
a standard more restrictive than
the national obscenity standard
rejected by the Supreme Court in
Stanley v. Georgia. Such a standard is likely to have a chilling
effect on broadcasters wishing to
avoid liability for obscenity.
With respect to a direct
broadcast satellite transmission of
a scrambled signal, there is no liability for transportation or broadcast of obscenity. Provided the
signal is scrambled before it
reaches the home, it is seemingly
protected under Stanley v. Georgia, which permits obscenity in
the home. The author adds, however, that the Supreme Court may
respond by overruling Stanley.
Frank A. Monago
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William M. Sweetnam
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